Over the last decade, the Army experienced many changes while fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The more transformative changes were demands placed on Soldiers and leaders to resource the war effort, introduction of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process and reorganizing operational units to a modular force structure. These changes created demands on personnel and leader development systems. As a shortage career field, junior logistics officers in Ordnance, Transportation and Quartermaster were particularly stressed as Army requirements outpaced its inventory of junior logistics officers. Challenges such as missed opportunities for broadening assignments, fragmented command relationships, disjointed unit deployments, multiple -in-lieu of‖ missions and filling MiTT requirements disrupted normal professional development timelines. As stewards of the Army, senior leaders should understand that junior officers had different developmental experiences.
Although battle hardened, junior logistics officers may require guidance transitioning to garrison operations and expect senior leaders to balance opportunities for education, training and broadening experiences outside the Army to prepare them for senior leader positions in the future.
HOW A DECADE OF CONFLICT AFFECTED JUNIOR LOGISTICS OFFICER DEVELOPMENT
If we don't get the people part of our business right, none of the other decisions will matter.
-Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Over the last decade the Army has experienced many changes while fighting two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several of the more significant and transformative were the personnel demands placed on Soldiers and leaders to resource the war effort, the introduction of the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) process and reorganizing combat units to a modular force structure. This paper addresses how these changes affected the junior logistics officers' professional development which was particularly stressed as a shortage career field within the Army.
War Necessities -Junior Logistics Officer Personnel Management
For nearly a decade of persistent conflict, the United States Army was stretched to provide the forces necessary. Specifically the Army's populations of junior logistics officers (Ordnance, Transportation, and Quartermaster) in the ranks of Lieutenant and Captain experienced the requirements of supporting the nation's war effort while serving in a shortage career field. As a group, the personnel management situation for junior logistics officers experienced the -perfect storm‖ of limited supply (due to reduced accessions during the late 1990's drawdown) and high demand since 2001. 2 The Army caused the high demand by increasing its junior logistics officer requirements by more than 35% while reorganizing to a modular force structure. 3 At the same time new logistics officer accessions remained stagnant and the operational tempo steadily increased. 4 Although officer accessions gradually improved, the initial shortage continues to have a lasting negative affect across the Army with units being filled between 50-80% of their required junior logistics officer requirements. 5 To prioritize and distribute officers in the force, the Army's Human Resources 
Continuous unit transitions became the norm as 19 units (Companies and
Detachments) and over 2,300 soldiers rotated through the 17th CSSB during its 15-month deployment. 22 
Gaps in Officer Professional Development -the Price of Being Over-Extended
If we include accidental death, which frequently is the result of high risk behavior, we find that less young men and women die in combat than die by their own actions. While the HP/RR/SP Report makes many recommendations -one of the most important revolves around leadership. The report calls for increased leader intervention to prevent high risk behavior and suicides within the ranks. 28 Senior leaders adept at leading in garrison must impart to their junior officers leadership principles critical for caring about soldiers in a non-deployed environment.
Adding to the concern about the -lost art of leadership‖ is the speed that junior officers advanced in rank, necessitated by wartime personnel requirements. Officers saw promotion timelines accelerated from lieutenant to captain at just over 36 months, reducing the overall time to achieving the rank by as much as 18 months compared to more senior year groups. 29 Organization theorist and systems thinking pioneer, Russell Ackoff, presented the perspective of organizations as human enterprises with people as the integral components of organizations and systems. 33 Ackoff encourages leaders to view their organizations holistically and use a systems thinking approach to decision making by realizing that initiatives and actions are dynamic, nonlinear, and create second and third-order effects and unintended consequences. 34 Similarly, the dynamics of the Army's modular logistics structure and ARFORGEN process created intangible affects which are hard to quantify; these include individual motivation, unit cohesion, command climate, and leadership, which have either supported or detracted from the development of junior logistics officers. Understanding the affects and inter-connections of the modular structure and ARFORGEN initiatives on officers' development over the last nine years is yet to be realized but should continue to be studied.
One danger senior officers should guard against is allowing junior logistics officers to see themselves as part of a bureaucratic system that places more emphasis on moving them through the ARFORGEN process on repeated deployments under multiple leaders instead of serving in an organization that emphasizes the value of should ensure institutional dynamics and assignment turbulence does not leave junior logistics leaders feeling abandoned. Also, they should continue to provide guidance and mentoring across unit boundaries throughout a subordinate officer's career. As leadership expert John Gardner asserts …the hierarchical position of leaders within their own system is of limited value, because some of the most critically important tasks require lateral leadership -boundary-crossing leadership -involving groups over whom they have no control. They must exercise leader like influence beyond the system over which they preside. 
Conclusion -While Senior Leadership is Clearly Key -Questions Remain
First and most important, the young Soldiers and leaders in our formations will emulate what they see, not what they hear…discussing the effects of modularity on leader development. We've changed the way leaders interact with each other. The traditional mentoring, coaching, and teaching two levels down have been somewhat disrupted by modularity. While the Army's personnel system needs to be better synchronized with the ARFORGEN process to improve balance -the Army has yet to achieve this. In the meantime, the Army's senior leaders and proponents should be involved in ensuring the Army provides junior officers balance in operational and institutional assignments, training, and educational opportunities by assisting officers to obtain broadening experiences outside the operational Army. Research, analysis, collaboration and compromise are needed to implement the best possible solutions -a systems thinking approach would consider potential unintended consequences of the changes undertaken. The Army should invest in better metrics, modeling capabilities and analytics to gather, sort and assess the potential impact of proposed policy changes with continuous evaluation after implementation. As an initial step, GEN Dempsey ordered studies and interviews with senior leaders to increase awareness about leader development issues driven by modularity and ARFORGEN and about the subject of -The Army Profession‖ in general. 41 Lastly, as DOD moves toward reducing active duty end-strength, the Army must guard against cutting enabling forces at the cost of continuing the negative dynamics junior logistics officers encountered during the last decade. The Army should take a guarded approach to structural redesign realizing the limitations of an all-volunteer force to regenerate its officer corps because unlike the civilian labor force the Army cannot laterally recruit experienced officers to fill gaps. Also, the Army must approach proposed cuts, retention incentives and accession programs deliberately to ensure mistakes experienced as a result of the last major draw-down are not repeated. 42 However, the Army should confidently move forward knowing that while stretched for nearly a decade of war, Soldiers and the junior officers who led them, perform magnificently. With the current emphasis on The Army Profession and filling existing experience gaps the Army can benefit by leveraging the combat experiences of its junior officers. It appears they will develop into an experienced group of multi-
